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Whether households pierce the corporate veil is a fundamental issue for eval- 
uating the radical changes in both tax policy and corporate financial behavior 
that have occurred in the United States during the 1980s. The share of pretax 
corporate earnings that are distributed to the owners of  corporate capital- 
either  as dividends,  share repurchases, or interest-has  increased signifi- 
cantly during this period. Reductions in dividend taxes coupled with increased 
tax burdens on capital gains have lowered the incentive to accumulate profits 
within the corporation and encouraged dividend payout. Tax  changes have 
also affected optimal capital structure. Net equity issues by U.S. firms have 
been negative in each year since 1984, as firms have replaced equity with debt 
finance. This paper investigates the effects of  increased cash payout, and of 
“forced realizations” of capital gains in corporate control transactions, on the 
level of aggregate consumption. 
The standard neoclassical paradigm suggests that these changes should not 
affect consumption, except through their effects on the cost of capital facing 
firms. Since households base consumption on their net worth, the question of 
whether capital gains are realized and whether cash is paid out of the firm or 
retained and reflected in higher asset values should not affect spending deci- 
sions. Numerous empirical studies have failed to reject the null hypothesis 
that the division of  corporate earnings between cash distributions and reten- 
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tions does not affect consumption and, therefore, have concluded that there is 
no corporate veil. 
An alternative view, supported as much by anecdotal evidence as by formal 
theoretical models, argues that households respond differently to different ac- 
cretions to wealth. Malinvaud (1986) argues that “households must consider 
one franc of retained earnings as being less permanently gained than that same 
franc if  it had been distributed as a dividend. In other words, even perfectly 
informed and rational households will not fully compensate by their consump- 
tion private corporate saving, not to speak of less well-informed or more care- 
less shareholders” (1 19). 
The corporate veil might also be due to investor reliance on rules of thumb 
or other behavioral principles. Shefrin and Statman (1985), for example, sug- 
gest that households often draw arbitrary distinctions between consuming out 
of principal and consuming out of income. Investors may be myopic, may fail 
to devote the necessary resources to monitor developments within firms, or 
may otherwise fail to completely pierce the corporate veil.  If  such behavior 
is widespread, the division of corporate income between cash payout and re- 
tained earnings could affect spending decisions. It is nevertheless difficult to 
determine the importance of such investor behavior on a priori grounds. The 
transparency of the corporate veil is therefore an empirical issue. 
Identifying the link between corporate cash flows and consumption is com- 
plicated by the fact that many factors that raise corporate profits and therefore 
corporate saving, such as technological shocks that increase the productivity 
of capital, also affect the opportunity set facing households. Finding that div- 
idends raise consumption may simply indicate that positive news about future 
cash flows increases consumer spending. The central problem is, therefore, 
finding a source of variation in corporate cash flow that does not directly affect 
consumption. I argued (Poterba 1987a) that shifts in the relative tax burdens 
on corporate payouts and retentions alter corporate financial policy but are 
unlikely to have large direct effects on household behavior. My empirical re- 
sults for the United States suggested that raising corporate payout by one dol- 
lar was associated with an  increase of  thirty cents or more in  consumption 
spending. 
This study extends my  previous investigation in two directions. First,  it 
exploits the tax policy variation in Britain and Canada, as well as the United 
States, to develop further tests of whether investors pierce the corporate veil. 
Second, it tests another link between cash flow and consumption by exploring 
whether forced capital gain realizations in takeover transactions affect con- 
sumer spending. 
This study is divided into five sections. The first outlines previous work on 
the question of whether households pierce the corporate veil. Section 2.2 de- 
scribes my consumption function specification and discusses econometric is- 
sues, Section 2.3 presents the aggregate data on the United States, Britain, 
and Canada that are used in estimation. Section 2.4 reports consumption func- 51  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
tions for each of the three countries and analyzes whether changes in dividend 
tax rates affect consumption. The results are not  conclusive, but for each 
country they point toward the presence of  a corporate veil. The fifth section 
examines how forced capital gain realizations affect consumption, in this case 
focusing exclusively on the United States. The findings suggest that such re- 
alizations may raise consumption by  as much as 40 cents on the dollar, pri- 
marily by increasing outlays on durables. The final section suggests directions 
for future work. 
2.1  Previous Evidence on Consumption and Corporate Cash Flow 
The hypothesis that households pierce the corporate veil received initial 
empirical support from studies on  the stylized pattern of  U.S. saving rates 
through time. Denison’s (1958) pioneering study observed that gross private 
saving was a remarkably stable fraction of GNP for the United States during 
the decade after World  War  11.  David and  Scadding (1974) confirmed this 
finding using a longer time series and generalized it by noting that the sum of 
the gross private saving rate and the government saving rate had varied very 
little over the previous century. 
Most subsequent studies have tested for the presence of a corporate veil by 
estimating either consumption or saving functions on aggregate time-series 
data. Modigliani’s (1  970) study examined the cross-national correlation be- 
tween corporate saving rates and total private saving rates. His point estimates 
generally suggested that higher retained earnings led to higher private saving 
rates, but the standard errors were too large to reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect. Feldstein (1973) studied U.S. consumption data for the period 1929- 
66, and found convincing evidence that households raise consumption in re- 
sponse to retained earnings. He rejected the strict Keynesian hypothesis that 
disposable income matters to the exclusion of  retained profits, but his point 
estimates suggested that the propensity to consume dividends (approximately 
76 cents per dollar) was larger than the comparable propensity to consume 
retained earnings (about 50 cents per dollar). In a parallel study for the United 
Kingdom, Feldstein and Fane (1973) found that a pound of dividend income 
raised consumption by 75 pence, while a pound of retained earnings had a 25- 
pence effect. 
The same pattern-higher  marginal propensities to spend from dividends 
than from retain earnings-emerges  in other, more recent, studies. In  some 
cases the differential was too small, or the standard errors were too large, to 
reject the null hypothesis of equal consumption effects. Howrey and Hymans 
(1978) conclude that  a one dollar decrease in  corporate saving caused by 
higher dividend payout would raise consumption by  25 cents.* However, von 
Furstenberg’s (1981) estimates suggest a change of between 40  and 60 cents. 
Both studies conclude that households pierce the corporate veil, a finding 
which is true to a degree. 52  James M. Poterba 
None  of  the studies that reject the corporate veil provide strong evidence 
that households completely pierce the corporate veil. In contrast, two studies 
by Bhatia (1979) and Hendershott and Peek (1989) claim to find evidencefor 
a corporate veil. Bhatia (1979) followed Feldstein’s (1973) methodology, add- 
ing several additional years of data and modifying some of  the data series in 
minor  ways.  He  found no evidence that  retained earnings-induced capital 
gains on corporate stock affect consumption any more than other capital gains, 
which implies that an increase in dividends financed by  reduced retentions 
would have  a large positive effect on consumption. Hendershott and  Peek 
(1989) adjust both personal and corporate saving for inflationary mismeasure- 
ment and conclude that previous evidence of a negative correlation between 
the two was primarily the result of opposite-signed inflationary biases. 
None of the foregoing studies address the potential endogeneity of corpo- 
rate  saving in  regression  equations explaining  aggregate consumption.  If 
profit rates vary through time, changes in corporate saving may in part reflect 
shocks to the economic environment that could affect consumption even if 
households do not pierce the corporate veil. One could even develop models 
with transactions costs for selling shares and imperfect credit markets where 
shocks to consumption affect corporate saving through the demand for cash 
dividends. 
The only studies that recognize the potential endogeneity of corporate sav- 
ing are Poterba (1987a) and Auerbach and Hassett (in this volume). These 
studies employ U.S. data for 1929-86,  and for the postwar period, respec- 
tively. The former study used changes in dividend taxation to identify exoge- 
nous shifts in the level of  corporate saving and found weak support for the 
view that corporate saving affects total private saving. Auerbach and Hassett 
work  in  the  Euler-equation framework  (surveyed  in  Hall  1989) and  test 
whether forecastable movements in dividends affect spending. If  households 
were liquidity constrained, then even forecastable dividend changes would 
affect spending. Auerbach and Hassett’s evidence that forecastable changes in 
dividends do not affect consumption is therefore strong evidence against the 
liquidity-constraints account  for the  corporate veil.  It  is  weaker evidence 
against some of the alternative explanations based on myopia or other consid- 
erations.3 
2.2  Consumption and Corporate Cash Flow 
An extension of the Ando-Modigliani (1963) aggregate consumption func- 
tion provides a useful shorthand to formalize the hypothesis that cash receipts 
affect consumption more than accruing capital gains. The standard life-cycle- 
permanent income formulation relates consumption to human wealth, the pre- 
sent discounted value of  after-tax  labor earnings,  as well  as financial and 
nonfinancial net  assets. Demographic variables, such as the fraction of  the 
population in their retirement years, may also alter the level of  per capital 53  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
consumption. Generalizing this framework to allow for the possibility that 
dividends affect household expenditures, the consumption function may  be 
written: 
(1)  C,  = a.  + alA, + a,HW,  + a,SHR65,  + a4DIV, + E,. 
In (l),  C,  denotes real per capita consumption, A, the household sector’s be- 
ginning of period stock of nonhuman wealth, HW, human wealth at the begin- 
ning of the period, SHR65 the fraction of the population aged 65 or greater, 
and DIV, cash dividend receipts. If  households pierce the corporate veil and 
dividends convey no information about future corporate profits that is not also 
reflected in share values, then a4  should be zero. 
It is critical to focus on variation in DIV, that is uncorrelated with other 
news that may affect consumption. Variation in tax policy induces such move- 
ments in dividends and may be used to identify a4.  The tax treatment of divi- 
dends versus retained earnings can be summarized in  a “tax discrimination 
variable,” 8,, defined as 
where m,,  denotes the marginal dividend tax rate on investor i in period r, z,, 
the effective capital gains tax rate for this investor, and w,,  the share of corpo- 
rate equity held by this in~estor.~  Provided dividend policy is determined by 
equating the  marginal benefit of  paying dividends, whether from reduced 
agency costs or improved signaling, to the tax cost of payout, 8, should affect 
dividend distributions. This yields an equation for firm behavior: 
(3) 
where Z,y includes corporate profits and other variables that may be correlated 
with the residuals in the consumption function. My identifying assumption is 
that 8, has no direct effect on consumption but operates only through its influ- 
ence on pay~ut.~  This implies that equation (1) can be estimated by instrumen- 
tal variables, using 8, as an instrument for DIV,. 
Equation (1) is exactly identified. One could therefore test for the presence 
of a corporate veil by estimating (1) by instrumental variables, using 8, as an 
instrument for DIV,. A more direct (but equivalent) test for the presence of 
the corporate veil is to include 8, in the consumption equation and test for the 
significance of this variable:6 
(4)  C,  = a, + a,A, + a,HW,  + a,SHR65,  + a58, + E,. 
This approach avoids the need to specify a detail model of corporate payout, 
an important virtue since no such model is generally accepted.’ 
Two  empirical difficulties arise in  estimating (4).  First, human wealth is 
unobservable. Hayashi (1981) addresses this problem by  quasi differencing 
(4)  and focusing on consumption responses to the unanticipated change in 
labor income (and its associated forecast power for human wealth). Since a2 
DIV, =  Po + Pie,  + Z,Y  + P,, 54  James M. Poterba 
is only an incidental parameter in this study, I adopt the simpler approach of 
assuming that human wealth is a constant multiple of current after-tax labor 
income: 
(5)  HW,  = YL,/p. 
The HW, in equation (4) can thus be replaced with  YL,, with the resulting 
coefficient reinterpreted accordingly.* 
The second econometric difficulty is that real per capita consumption and 
some of the nontax explanatory variables in (4) are nearly nonstationary time 
~eries.~  Differencing (4)  to achieve stationarity may eliminate much of  the 
useful low-frequency variation in the tax discrimination variable, raising its 
noise-to-signal ratio and biasing the estimated coefficient toward zero. I there- 
fore estimate (4) both in levels and differences. I present levels estimates with 
and without a time trend, and differenced estimates with and without an inter- 
cept, since these are parallel specifications. The estimated standard errors in 
the level equation are corrected for serial correlation using the Newey-West 
(1987) algorithm allowing for correlation at one lag. 
A similar approach can be used to study whether other forms of  cash in- 
come from capital investments affect consumption. One particularly interest- 
ing cash flow, in light of the recent growth in corporate share repurchases and 
takeover transactions, is the stream of realized capital gains that result from 
“involuntary” stock sales when firms are taken over or  go private. Bagwell 
and Shoven (1989) report that, in  1986, when cash dividend payments were 
$77.1 billion, share repurchases by  U.S.  corporations totaled $41.5 billion, 
and merger and acquisition expenditures were $74.5 billion. 
There are many reasons for expecting a positive effect of involuntary real- 
izations on consumption. In  models with costly trading or other frictions in 
portfolio adjustment, for example,  a forced  realization may  catalyze con- 
sumption spending. Evidence that realized gains are correlated with consump- 
tion outlays is not informative on the general issue of whether forced realiza- 
tions spur consumption, since most gain realizations are voluntary. The same 
factors that impinge on consumption decisions may therefore affect realiza- 
tions. Asset sales in many corporate control transactions, however, are invol- 
untary. Households who own shares in firms that are purchased for cash (as 
opposed to with securities swaps) receive cash for their shares, even if  they 
had planned to hold their shares for a long period. 
Equation (4) can be augmented to test whether the value of cash payouts in 
control transactions, CASHMERG,, affects consumption: 
(6)  C, = a!”  + &,A, + a,HW,  + a,SHR65,  + a!$, 
+ a,CASHMERG,  + E,. 
The contemporaneous level of corporate takeovers may be correlated with the 
error in (6)  because it may lead to asset revaluations as investors decide that 
other stocks are “in play.” I therefore modify (6) in some cases, replacing A, 55  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
with A,+  I. The total value of assets dated after the news about control trans- 
actions should avoid the revaluation problem, although it raises other difficul- 
ties.  lo 
2.3  Data Issues 
Two criteria restrict the set of countries for which the aggregate consump- 
tion equations could be estimated. First, the countries need significant varia- 
tion in  the relative tax burdens on dividends and capital gains. Second, the 
tests require regularly available information on household net worth. The lat- 
ter is a binding constraint for most countries. Three countries that satisfy these 
conditions and for which data are readily available are Canada, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom.“ Since the principal novelty in my estima- 
tion is the tax variable 8,, I begin by discussing it and then briefly mention the 
other data series. 
2.3.1  Tax Discrimination Variables 
For each country, the aggregate dividend tax preference variable is calcu- 
lated as the weighted average of  (  l-mi)/( 1-zi)  with weights based on equity 
ownership. In Britain the tax discrimination variable also allows for changes 
through time in the relative corporate tax burdens on retained versus distrib- 
uted profits; these variables are described in more detail in Poterba and Sum- 
mers ( 1985) and King (  1977). 
Table 2.1 presents time series for 8, for each country. In the United States 
8, has increased over time. The increasing fraction of corporate shares held by 
nontaxable investors, the decline in personal marginal tax rates on dividends, 
and the recent increase in  capital gains taxes have raised 8, from approxi- 
mately .60 in the early 1950s to roughly .85 in the late 1980s. 
The United Kingdom both raised and lowered dividend taxes during the 
sample period. Adoption of  a two-tiered rate of  corporate taxation in  1958, 
with a higher rate on retained than on distributed profits, encouraged payout. 
This policy was changed in  1965 to a classical corporate income tax system 
of the type used in the United States, with the net effect of  lowering 8, and 
discouraging dividend payments. Another policy reversal in  1972, with the 
adoption of an integrated corporate income tax, made dividend payout more 
attractive.’*  The substantial increase in 8, during the late 1970s reflects declin- 
ing marginal tax burdens on individual investors, due to systematic reductions 
in tax rates at high income levels. 
Data on the marginal tax  burdens for Canadian shareholders were  only 
available for 1963-86.  The increase in the tax incentive for dividend payout 
beginning in  1972 results from introduction of a capital gains tax with a stat- 
utory rate of 27%. The discrete increase in payout incentives in 1978 is due to 
a change in the dividend tax credit scheme, which made dividend credits so 
generous that the tax system was “over-integrated.’’  Beginning in  1982, and, 56  James M. Poterba 
Table 2.1:  Dividend Tax Preference Variables 

























































































































































Nore: Each entry shows the ratio of  after-tax income from one dollar of  earnings paid out as 
dividends to one dollar of retained earnings. The data series for the United States is drawn from 
Poterba (1987a),  that for Britain was furnished by Mervyn King, and the Canadian series was 
supplied by Jack Mintz. 
more important, at the end of the sample, the dividend credit provisions were 
modified to eliminate the extraordinary incentives for dividend distribution, 
Jenkins (1986) discusses the various policy changes in some detail. 
The most difficult part of estimating the tax discrimination variable is mea- 
suring the capital gains tax burden. Since gains are taxed only on realization, 57  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
the effective tax burden depends on  investor behavior. If  gains are realized 
soon after they accrue, the tax burden will be higher than if gains are held for 
long periods. Estimates of z typically assume relatively simple rules for inves- 
tor behavior; for example, that investors sell a fixed fraction of  their assets 
each period. Since the capital gains tax rate is therefore measured with much 
greater error than the dividend tax rates, some of my empirical work explores 
the consequences of using only the dividend tax rate to measure relative tax 
burdens.  l3 
2.3.2  Other Data Series 
The remaining data series used in my analysis require less comment. An- 
nual consumption in constant prices is drawn from the OECD National In- 
come Accounts, and I estimate equations using both total consumption out- 
lays and expenditures exclusive of durables. I focus on the postwar period for 
comparability across sample countries. Pretax labor income was defined as 
wages and salaries plus other labor income (employer contributions for pen- 
sion plans and other benefits). An  average tax burden on labor income was 
calculated as income tax payments divided by the sum of pretax labor income, 
property and entrepreneurial income, and the operating surplus of unincorpo- 
rated enterprises. The results are relatively insensitive to the choice of  tax 
rates and did not change when pretax rather than posttax labor income was 
used to measure YL, in equation (4).  When conversion from current to con- 
stant prices was needed, I used the price deflator for nondurable consumption. 
Data on net worth of the household sector are drawn from national balance 
sheets. These data begin in 1948 for the United States, 1957 for Britain, and 
1962 for Canada. For the United States and the United Kingdom, tangible 
assets such as residences and some financial assets, particularly equities, are 
measured at market value. Other financial assets, notably corporate and gov- 
ernment bonds, are reported at book value. The Canadian data do not include 
any  market value estimates; they are simply book-value estimates of  asset 
holdings, and as such they are much less useful than the data for the other two 
nations. The net worth series are reported in appendix table 2A. 1. Data were 
deflated to per capita terms using population data drawn from the U.K. An- 
nual Abstract of  Statistics, the Historical Statistics of  Canada, and the Statis- 
tical Abstract for the United States. The fraction of the population aged 65 or 
older was also drawn from these sources and interpolated to create an annual 
series where necessary. 
The final variable of interest is CASHMERG,, the value of cash payouts in 
corporate control transactions. This variable was constructed for the United 
States using the W.  T.  Grimm & Company data series for cash merger and 
acquisition activity.  I4 This data series is presented in appendix table 2A.2, and 
shows cash transactions doubling between 1977 and 1981 and doubling again 
by  1985. For the United Kingdom, a data series on total cash merger activity 
is published by  the Department of  Trade and Industry for the period since 
1969. Data on total merger activity for earlier years was combined with infor- 58  James M. Poterba 
mation from Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) on the allocation of  merger 
finance between cash and other securities to estimate the value of cash distri- 
butions. This data series, which displays a rapid increase in the mid-l980s, is 
also shown in the appendix table. 
2.4  Estimation Results: Dividend Taxation and Consumption 
This section presents the results of estimating equation (4)  for the United 
States, Britain, and Canada. In table 2.2, parts A and B present the findings 
for the United States, using total consumption and total consumption exclud- 
ing durables as the dependent variables, respectively. The coefficients on in- 
come and net worth are broadly consistent with the findings in earlier studies, 
although some equations evidence small net worth coefficients (around .01). 
In both the level and difference specifications the dividend preference vari- 
able, 8,,  has a positive effect on consumption. This is the direction predicted 
by the corporate veil hypothesis, since higher values of 8,  correspond to lower 
dividend tax burdens and higher levels of  corporate payout. Only two of  the 
specifications I present (one for levels, one for differences) yield coefficients 
on 8, that are statistically significant at the conventional 95% confidence level. 
In all of the equations the estimated coefficients are positive, however, with t- 
statistics above 1.3. 
The point  estimates of  the dividend tax  effects vary  substantially across 
specifications. They suggest that a ten percentage point increase in the divi- 
dend tax rate would reduce per capita consumption (in 1982 dollars) by be- 
tween $100 and $400. More than half of this effect is on durable expenditures, 
as comparison between the estimates for total consumption (table 2.2, part A) 
and consumption excluding durables (table 2.2, part B) demonstrates. If one 
takes the view that expenditure on durables is essentially a form of  saving, 
then the evidence is more favorable to the hypothesis that households pierce 
the corporate veil. In any case, it is clear that changes in the dividend tax rate 
affect the allocution of  saving, shifting resources from business investment to 
household durables.  l5 
Two  other features of  the results warrant comment.  First,  the estimated 
coefficients on 8, usually decline when the equation includes a time trend (or 
an intercept when the equation is estimated in differences). Second, while the 
variable measuring the fraction of the population over age 65 does not signifi- 
cantly affect the other coefficients, its own coefficient is implausibly large. 
The coefficient in the last column suggests that a 10 percent increase in the 
share of  the population over 65 would increase per capita consumption by 
$4,860 (in  1982 dollars). These unusual findings may  be due to the short 
sample period and the trend in this variable, which may allow it to proxy for 
many time-varying effects. This is confirmed by the estimates in columns 2-3 
of  table 2.2, part A, where introducing the demographic variable induces a 
large change in the estimated coefficient on the trend variable. 59  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
Table 2.2  Aggregate Consumption and Dividend Tax Preference, United States, 
1950-87 
Explanatory Variable  A. Total Consumption Spending 
Constant 
Per capita after-tax 
labor income 























-  .559  -  10.381 
(1.537)  (1.117) 
,718  1.252 
(.201)  (.067) 
.019  -.006 
(.029)  (.013) 
2.942  3.980 
(2.187)  (1.092) 
,056  -.096 
(.028)  (.015) 
. . .  105,380 
(9.334) 
Levels  Levels 
,202  ,092 
,187  1.351 
,054  . . .  ... 
(.018) 
,828  1.021  .854 
(.128)  (.125)  (.114) 
,014  .019  ,012 
(.014)  (.015)  (.013) 
1.050  1.662  1.103 
(.801)  (.865)  (.749) 
...  . . .  48.594 
(12.720) 
Diffs  Diffs  Diffs 
.079  ,088  ,074 
1.570  1.678  1.735 
B. Nondurable and Service Consumption 
Constant 
Per capita after-tax 
labor income 
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Nore. Estimates are based on annual data, 1950-87.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses; 
for the level specification they are. corrected for the presence of first-order serial correlation using 
the Newey-West (1987) procedure. 
To explore the sensitivity of these results to tax variation during the 1980s, 
I reestimated each equation for the sample period ending in 1980. The esti- 
mated coefficients on 8, in the level specifications declined substantially, but 
the estimates from differenced models were virtually unchanged. The stan- 
dard errors for all for the estimated coefficients increase and the null hypothe- 60  James M. Poterba 
sis that households completely pierce the corporate veil is no longer rejected, 
even at quite low confidence levels. Including a dummy variable for the period 
after 1980 has the same effect on an equation estimated for the full sample 
period, causing a substantial decline in the coefficient on the tax discrimina- 
tion variable. 
Table 2.3 reports estimates of equation (4) for the United Kingdom. In the 
level specification for both total and nondurable consumption, the no-veil hy- 
pothesis is rejected at standard confidence levels. These results are stronger 
than the comparable findings for the  United  States. When the equation is 
estimated in differenced form, however, the estimated coefficient on the divi- 
dend tax burden is again statistically insignificant, though it remains positive 
and suggests that lower dividend tax rates raise consumer spending. The im- 
portance of durable expenditures is also confirmed by these results: the esti- 
mated coefficients on total consumption are roughly twice as large as those on 
nondurable spending. 
The final set of estimates, for Canada, are reported in table 2.4. Once again 
the  estimated coefficients  on  net  worth  and  after-tax  labor  income  seem 
broadly plausible,  while the large coefficients on the demographic variable 
seem implausible. The results on dividend taxation for Canada are different 
from those in the United States and the United Kingdom: in the level equa- 
tions, the estimate of a5  is negative. The differenced equations yield small and 
statistically insignificant positive coefficients. I explored the findings from the 
level equations somewhat further by separating the Canadian 8, series into one 
component related to the marginal tax burden on dividends, and another aris- 
ing from the tax burden on capital gains. When I assume that the capital gains 
tax rate is zero, estimates of a5  in levels are positive and lead to rejection of 
the “no veil” null hypothesis at confidence levels similar to those at which the 
null hypothesis was rejected for the United States.  l6 
A brief summary of the empirical import of these results is provided in table 
2.5. Using 1986 as a benchmark, it reports the change in per capita consump- 
tion that representative estimates for each of the three sample countries would 
predict following a five percentage point increase in 8. This corresponds to a 
five percentage point reduction in the marginal dividend tax rate only when 
the capital gains tax rate is zero. The requisite change in the dividend tax rate 
is slightly smaller with positive capital gains rates. The estimated changes in 
total consumer spending from such a change vary from less than one-fifth of  1 
percent in the United Kingdom, to one-half of 1 percent in Canada, to three- 
quarters of  1 percent in the United States. These changes are relatively large 
when compared with personal saving, which is typically between 5 and  10 
percent of consumption. In the United States, for example, an .81 percentage 
point increase in consumption would correspond to a reduction of  one-sixth 
in personal saving ($124 billion). A five percentage point increase in 8 is of 
the order of  magnitude of the changes due to each of the 1981 and  1986 tax 
reforms.  l7 Table 2.3  Aggregate Consumption and Dividend Tax Preference, United Kingdom, 1958-86 
Consumption 
Explanatory Variable  Total  Nondurable and Service 
Constant 
Per capita after-tax labor 
Per capita net worth 
income 
Dividend tax preference 
Percentage of population 
Time trend 
(8,) 
65 or older 
-  1.182 
(.106) 
,329 









































































































Note. Estimates are based on annual data, 1958-86.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses; for the level specification they are corrected for the presence of first- 
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Table 2.4  Aggregate Consumption and Dividend Tax Preference, Canada, 
1963-86 
Consumption 
Explanatory Variable  Total  Nondurable and Service 
Constant 
Per capita after-tax 
labor income 





capital gains tax) 












(  ,374) 






































-  ,003 
(.019) 


























(.01  I) 
,094 
(  ,200) 
20.652 




Note.  Estimates are based on annual data,  1963-86.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses; for the 
level specification they are corrected for the presence of first-order serial correlation using the Newey- 
West (1987) procedure. Equations in levels do not include time-trend variables; these were estimated but 
always proved unimportant and did not affect the other coefficients. 
Table 2.5  Estimated Consumption Effects from Changes  in Dividend Tax 
Canada  United  United States 
Kingdom 
Per capita consumption in  1986  1 1,475  4,171  11,611 
Estimated consumption shift from  +  53  +7  -t  95 
five percentage point decline in  (34)  (7)  (49) 
dividend tax burden (0) 
Percentage change in consumption  + .46%  +.  18%  + .8l% 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on estimated coefficients in tables 2.2-2.4.  Point estimate 
assumptions are from table 2.2,  part A, col. 5 for the United States, from table 2.3,  col. 3 for 
the United Kingdom, and table 2.4,  col. 2 for Canada. Prediction standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
The results in this section provide substantial support for the view  that 
changes in corporate financial policy between retained and distributed profits 
affect the private saving rate. Higher dividend payouts induced by lower divi- 
dend tax rates are likely to translate into higher consumption levels. These 
results suggest a substantively important, yet relatively neglected, channel 
through which changes in capital income taxes affect saving decisions. 63  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
2.4  Consumption and Realized Capital Gainsla 
This section undertakes the limited task of  evaluating the statistical link 
between forced realizations and consumption.  I9  The results of estimating (6) 
for the United States are shown in table 2.6. All of the equations are estimated 
in differenced form, with the measure of net worth in the first and third col- 
umns corresponding to beginning-of-period asset values while that in the sec- 
ond  and  fourth  columns  is  the  end-of-period value.  The  hypothesis that 
as  = 0 is rejected at standard levels in the equation for total consumption 
outlays where wealth is measured at the beginning of the year. The point esti- 
mates suggest that one dollar of realized gains raises spending by roughly 60 
cents. More than half of this is spending on durables, since the coefficient falls 
to .21 (a 21 cent per dollar increase) when the dependent variable is nondur- 
able and service consumption. When the wealth variable is measured at the 
end of the period the coefficient also declines, falling to .34 for total consump- 
tion and virtually zero for nondurables and services. The hypothesis that cash 
payouts have no effect on consumption cannot be rejected at standard levels in 
these equations, but the point estimates continue to suggest a substantively 
important link between cash payout and consumption.20  The dividend tax var- 
iable does not change very much with this modification of the equation, how- 
ever, which suggests that my findings are not due to a correlation between tax 
rates and wealth.21 
The remaining coefficients in the consumption function change somewhat 
when realized gains are included in the specification. The coefficient on 8 in 
Table 2.6  Aggregate Consumption and Involuntary Capital Gains Realizations 
Consumption 
Explanatory Variable  Total  Nondurable and Service 
Per capita cash 
takeover transactions 
Per capita after-tax 
labor income 











































36.01  1 
(7.775) 
SEE  ,071  ,066  ,046  ,040 
DW  1.838  1.868  1.872  1.811 
Note:  Estimates  are. based on annual data, 1951-86.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
The net worth measure in cols. 1 and 3 is the beginning-of-period value of household net worth, 
while in cols. 2 and 4 it is the end-of-period value, which is dated after all news about takeovers 
has been revealed. Equations are estimated in differences. 64  James M. Poterba 
the total consumption equation increase, although it is still within the bounds 
of the earlier estimates. 
Since the data on cash takeovers show a sharp rise during the 1980s, there 
is a danger that the results are simply capturing the increase in consumption 
relative to income and wealth during the  1980s. To  assess this possibility I 
reestimated the equations in table 2.6 for the sample period finishing in  1980. 
The coefficient on  CASHMERG, declined and the estimated standard error 
rose sharply. It thus appears that pre-1980 data do not provide strong evidence 
on the link between realizations and consumption. 
A second method of validating the findings is to estimate a similar equation 
for other countries. An analogue to the CASHMERG series was available for 
the United Kingdom since  1964, and the estimation results are remarkably 
similar to the findings for the United States: 
C, =  .145 + .016*A, + .627*YL, - 74.893*SHR65, 
(.054)  ( .OlO)  (  .166)  (36.560) 
+ .117*8, +  .569*CASHMERG, 
( .151)  ( .452) 
R2 = .719,  DW = 2.38,  SEE = .038,  1964-86 
Although the hypothesis that cash takeover expenditures do not affect con- 
sumption can not be rejected at conventional confidence levels, the point esti- 
mate implies that each pound of cash spending on takeovers raises consump- 
tion  by  approximately  50  pence.22 The  relatively  short  sample  for  this 
equation makes strong inferences difficult, but the similarity of  the findings 
between the United States and the United Kingdom supports the view that 
forced realizations raise consumption. 
The results in this section are suggestive, though hardly conclusive. They 
call attention to possible saving effects of the financial restructuring of  U.S. 
industry during the 1980s. Even small effects operating through this channel 
could have potentially large effects on measured private saving. Assuming 80 
cents of  each dollar of cash outlays for takeovers is reinvested (the estimates 
above point toward values closer to 60 cents), the level of  such spending in 
the mid- 1980s could have depressed personal saving by  approximately $15 
billion per year. This effect is roughly half the size of  the estimated effect of 
higher dividend payout in the last section. 
2.5  Conclusion 
The results presented here support, but are not definitive evidence for, the 
proposition that investors respond differently to cash receipts from firms and 
to accruing capital gains. Consistent but weak evidence for the United States, 
Great Britain, and Canada suggests that higher dividend tax rates lower con- 
sumption, an effect that  I interpret as operating through reduced corporate 65  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
dividend payout. Time series evidence from the United States and the United 
Kingdom suggests that forced realizations of capital gains in takeovers may 
also spur consumption. 
These results point toward a host of  interesting questions concerning the 
influence of fiscal policy on consumption. If  investor behavior deviates from 
the neoclassical paradigm in ways that render corporate financial policy im- 
portant for saving decisions, then tax distortions in financing acquire a new 
dimension and may play an important role in affecting personal saving. 
The limited time-series data in each nation restricts the statistical power of 
single-country tests for a corporate veil. Future work should attempt to en- 
large the sample of  available data by confirming or refuting the patterns ob- 
served here  with  data  from  other countries.  Searching for patterns across 
countries in the size of the dividend tax effect and the composition of  the 
investor population, for example, could provide further insights on the link 
between corporate financing and consumption. 
(Appendix follows on pages 66-67.) 66  James M. Poterba 
Appendix 
Table 2A.1  Household Net Worth, the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom, 1950-87 
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Note:  Entries are measured  in  current  prices,  billions of  units of  local currency. Data for the 
United States are drawn from the Balance Sheets of  the US.  Economy (Board of Governors of 
Federal Reserve  1988). those for Britain from Bryant (1987) and Revel1 and Roe (1971), with 
interpolation  by  author between  1966-69  and  1970-72;  those  for Canada were provided  by 
Patrick O’Hagen of  Statistics Canada. 67  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
Table 2A.2  Cash Merger and Acquisition Activity, the United States and the 
United Kingdom, 1950-86 






































































































Note:  Entries are measured in billions of 1982 dollars for the United States and billions of  1985 
pounds for the United Kingdom.  Data are drawn from W.  T.  Grimm Mergerstat  Review with 
earlier data based on lTC tabulations for the United States and from the Department of  Trade 
and Industry Business  Monitor for the United Kingdom. 68  James M. Poterba 
Notes 
1. One traditional explanation of how cash flow may affect consumption, the pres- 
ence of liquidity constraints, is unlikely to explain the corporate veil. Avery and Ellie- 
hausen (1986) report that 43 percent of  publicly traded common stock is owned by 
households in the top one half of  1 percent, and 85 percent by  those in the top  10 
percent of the income distribution. Borrowing constraints are unlikely to be important 
for these investors, especially since they have a ready stock of equities to use as collat- 
eral. 
2. Their subsample estimates in some cases suggest smaller consumption effects, in 
some cases even an implausible decrease in consumption. 
3.  The differences in results for the postwar period between the Auerbach-Hassett 
study (in this volume) and the present paper are largely due to differences in specifica- 
tion. My results suggest that much of the link between dividend payout and consump- 
tion operates through expenditures  on durables, while their  analysis focuses exclu- 
sively on nondurable and service consumption. In addition, my specification includes 
a number of demographic and other variables that they omit, and I omit variables (such 
as the rate of  return) that they include. Although Auerbach and Hassett conclude there 
is no corporate veil, I show below that their point estimates of how changes in dividend 
payout would affect consumption are on the same order of magnitude as those in the 
current study. 
4.  The tax  discrimination  variable can  also be affected by  differential corporate 
taxation of retained and distributed profits as existed in the United Kingdom for part of 
our sample. 
5.  This assumption is open to question since much of the variation in the relative 
tax burden on dividends, especially in the United States, is due to systematic tax re- 
forms that also affect the tax burdens on other types of capital income. Evidence from 
Hall (1988) and other studies, however, suggests that changes in after-tax asset returns 
are virtually  uncorrelated  with time-series movements in consumption growth.  The 
identifying assumption is therefore unlikely to be seriously violated. 
6.  Auerbach and Hassett (in this volume) emphasize that it is essential to control for 
wealth in this equation  since otherwise shocks to 8, that affect wealth may provide 
spurious evidence of a corporate veil. Most of the equations in the present paper in- 
clude household wealth at the beginning of the calendar year as an explanatory vari- 
able. This does not completely control for changes in share values that may be related 
to dividend tax changes. Several equations in sec. 2.4 include end-of-period wealth as 
an explanatory variable; this should avoid the problem of 8,-induced changes in asset 
values. 
7.  I am grateful to Robert Hall, who discussed my earlier paper on this topic, for 
persuading me to adopt this approach. My decision was unrelated to his assignment as 
the discussant of the present paper. 
8.  I use the contemporaneous value of YL, even though HW, is the beginning of 
period value of human wealth; the results are not affected by use of the once-lagged 
value. The substitution based on (5) is valid only when the growth rate and discount 
rates applied to labor income are constant through time.  I tried interacting after-tax 
labor income with various proxies for real interest rates, but the basic findings reported 
below were unaffected. The interest rate-YL interaction term usually had a negative 
but statistically insignificant coefficient. 
9. Numerous studies including Campbell and Mankiw (1987) and Campbell and 
Deaton (1987) have investigated the stochastic properties of these data series. 
10.  End-of-period asset values are clearly affected by within-period shocks to con- 
sumption, so A,,  ,  and E, may be correlated. 69  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
11. Balance sheet data on household net worth are available for Japan since 1969, 
but that time series seemed too short to warrant study. 
12. The U.K. tax rate on shareholders refers only to the tax burdens on individual 
investors, not a weighted average across all investor classes. Since most of the varia- 
tion in 8,  arises from changes in either the corporate tax code or the tax rules affecting 
individuals, this data series is likely to track the “correct” 8, series reasonably well. 
13.  More detailed ,discussion of the behavior of investors facing realization-based 
capital gains tax schemes can be found in McCarten (1988) for Canada and in Poterba 
(1987b) for the United States. 
14.  The Grim  series is extrapolated to the early years of the sample using infor- 
mation from the Federal Trade Commission and tabulations on form of payment in 
mergers from Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988). 
15. An issue that deserves further study is the extent to which corporate payouts 
affect the timing, rather than the level, of consumption. Dividend payouts and capital 
gain realizations  may induce households to purchase durables they would otherwise 
have purchased at some future date. 
16.  The results for the United States and Britain were insensitive to setting the effec- 
tive capital gains tax rate to zero. This is because there is more variation in rn relative 
to z, and in the corporate-level tax discrimination variable, in these countries than in 
Canada. 
17.  Estimates in Poterba (1987a) suggest that a change in 8, by .05, which is a 6.4 
percent change, would lead to increased dividend payout of approximately 11 percent 
or $8.3 billion per year. Thus the consumption change is on the same order of magni- 
tude as the change in dividend payout, and, if  anything, the present point estimates 
suggesting that consumption changes by more than the change in dividends are implau- 
sibly large. In contrast, the Auerbach-Hassett (in this volume) findings imply this div- 
idend change would raise nondurable and service consumption by .24 percent, or $6.7 
billion. My results in table 2.2, part B (using the coefficient in col. 5) imply nondur- 
able and service consumption rises by  $17.6 billion. Thus although the papers reach 
quite different conclusions, the point estimates imply consumption changes of the same 
order of magnitude. 
18.  This section was stimulated by joint work with George Hatsopoulos and Paul 
Krugman. 
19.  Earlier studies have examined the influence of accruing capital gains on house- 
hold saving. Hendershott  and Peek (1989), for example, find a two cent decline in 
saving for each one dollar increase in corporate equity values. 
20.  This effect is somewhat stronger when the equations  are estimated  in levels 
rather than differences. Since the differenced specification is, however, less prone to 
spurious conclusions based on trending series, I focus on those results. 
21.  Auerbach  and Hassett  (in this volume) observe that one cannot rule out the 
possibility that wealth and 8, are correlated, so my  estimated tax effects may just be 
mislabeled wealth effects. This seems unlikely, not just because the results are insensi- 
tive to the dating of wealth, but also because they are too large. A 5 percent change in 
the dividend tax rate would cause a 6.8 percent increase in share values if  the capital- 
ized value of dividend taxes was exactly measured by my 8, series and if dividend taxes 
were fully capitalized into prices. Using the 1986 stock market value of $2.2 trillion 
held by households, the  wealth-induced rise in consumption  would be $2.8 billion 
(.019*.068*2200,  where .019 is the wealth coefficient in the consumption equation). 
This is far less than my estimated direct consumption effect from 8,. 
22.  I examined the impact of using end-of-period wealth in these equations and, as 
in the United States, the estimated merger coefficient dropped substantially. 70  James M. Poterba 
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Comment  Robert E. Hall 
Two  facts drive Poterba’s interesting paper:  First, in  all three countries he 
studies, there has been a general decline in the bias of the tax system against 
dividends. The upward trend of the dividend tax preference index as shown in 
table 2.1 has diminished the disincentive to corporate dividend payout over 
the past four decades. Second, in the United States and Britain, consumption 
has risen in relation to the Ando-Modigliani life-cycle consumption function. 
Consumers spend more for given levels of  wealth and earnings than they did 
earlier. 
Poterba’s conclusion is that the upward trend in consumption is the result 
of higher dividend payout, stimulated by  the diminished tax disincentive. In 
the model he has in mind, consumers pay attention to cash receipts rather than 
just the present discounted value of corporate earnings as revealed in the stock 
market. When the tax bias changes and corporations switch to greater pay- 
out, consumption rises in  that  model.  By contrast,  in the standard Ando- 
Modigliani model, stock market valuation is all that consumers care about. 
Poterba’s evidence adds to the growing literature that tries to make the case 
that consumers are more sensitive to current cash flows than they would be in 
the pure life-cycle model. 
Though I do not think that Poterba’s evidence can be dismissed, I find it a 
little fragile. First, much of  the effect is in  durables, a form of  saving. The 
life-cycle model does not predict that consumers will respond to higher divi- 
dend payout by  accumulating durables; rather, the extra cash flow should go 
into financial assets. But this failure of  the life-cycle model should not be 
equated with simple excess consumption. Second, the standard errors of the 
effects are large. Even taken completely at face value, the results could have 
Robert E. Hall is professor of  economics at Stanford University and is also senior fellow at 
Stanford’s Hoover Institution. He is a research associate of  the National Bureau  of  Economic 
Research and serves as director of the bureau’s Program on Economic Fluctuations. 72  James M. Poterba 
arisen from purely random variation. Make only a modest allowance for topic 
selection (it was the coincident trends that led Poterba to run the regressions 
in  the first place) and specification search, and the findings become statisti- 
cally unconvincing. Third, the failure to find the relation in one of the three 
countries, Canada, weakens the case. There has been almost as much varia- 
tion in  the payout disincentive in Canada, but no variation in consumption 
around the Ando-Modigliani model resulting from those movements. Why are 
Canadian consumers not sensitive to cash flow in the same way that U.S. and 
British consumers are? 
As  Poterba notes,  the fragility of  the results is due in  part to the slow- 
moving character of the changes in the dividend bias. Different combinations 
of  other slow-moving right-hand variables, such as a time trend or the per- 
centage of  the population aged 65 and over, make large differences in the 
coefficient  of the dividend bias variable. Further, putting a much lower weight 
on low frequencies, by using first differences, drastically reduces the coeffi- 
cient of the dividend bias. 
In view of the importance of slow-moving influences on consumption, fur- 
ther research on this topic needs to look at other well-known factors. These 
include, first, the dramatic increase in real asset returns in the 1980s. In prin- 
ciple, this increase should have had wealth and substitution effects on con- 
sumption. The omission means that the dividend bias coefficient is biased to 
the extent that changes in the tax system occurred at the same time that real 
returns rose, even if there is no casual link. Second, in the United States, the 
1980s saw a dramatic increase in the likely volume of deferred taxation. Con- 
sumers were bombarded with news stories to the effect that current taxes were 
too low  to pay  for the government, so tax  rates would have to rise in the 
future. This is another slow-moving omitted influence in Poterba’s equation. 
The paper assumes, without showing or citing evidence, that the dividend 
bias variable actually corresponds to changes in dividend payouts. It is pos- 
sible (but, I believe, untrue), that consumption rises when the bias variable 
moves in the direction of higher payouts, but that payouts do not actually 
change.  Such a finding would be paradoxical. It  would be nice if  Poterba 
would reassure us that payouts actually track changes in payout incentives. In 
this respect, his footnote 17 is an overreaction. 
In the 1980s, corporations finally awakened to the folly of returning value 
to shareholders through dividends and began to return value predominantly 
through repurchase of  shares. Poterba argues that repurchases that occur as 
part of  changes in corporate control are exogenous to the consumer. Hence 
forced realizations from merger and related activity is another way to test the 
invariance of  consumption to events that do not affect true wealth. Poterba 
moves rather quickly over the topic of how wealth is affected by cash buyouts. 
If  the wealth variable in the consumption function measures the change in 
wealth associated with buyouts correctly, then the coefficient on the actual 
buyout proceeds should be zero, his null hypothesis. Even when the buyout 73  Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil 
occurs at  a large premium to  immediate past  market value, consumption 
should respond only to the resulting increase in total wealth. However, in an 
economy where corporations are valued persistently far below their breakup 
values, there is room for a difference between shareholders’ valuations and 
market value. Waves of  buyouts, stimulated by  changes in laws and regula- 
tions, could well enter the Ando-Modigliani consumption function because 
they raise shareholders’ valuations in relation to current market value. Hence 
Poterba’s null hypothesis is not obviously a correct characterization of rational 
consumer behavior. 
In any case, the empirical findings on buyouts are at least as fragile as those 
for dividends. There is essentially no case that buyout cash stimulates nondur- 
able and services consumption. There is a hint that the cash goes into con- 
sumer durables, contrary to Poterba’s null hypothesis, which requires that the 
cash go entirely into replacement financial assets. 
Given the imprecision of the findings for buyouts, it would be interesting to 
see if microdata on the behavior of actual recipients of buyout cash could give 
sharper results. 
As a general matter, Poterba’s results do not compel the rejection of the life- 
cycle consumption model. There are some hints that some of the failings of 
the model, especially at low frequencies, may be associated with changes in 
the dividend bias of  the tax system and with rising buyout activity. But these 
hints are not strong enough to displace the life-cycle model from its dominant 
position in consumption economics. This Page Intentionally Left Blank